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Moldova’s position on the European Union’s borders has led to significant migration flows of 
Moldovan citizens towards EU countries. These migration flows have intensified given the fact that 
Moldova is confronting a prolonged transition period following on from the collapse of the Soviet 
System, and given the political and economic advantages that derive from migration to the EU. The 
EU is concerned about the illegal methods employed by Moldovan citizens as they emigrate. The 
Moldovan government has committed itself to improving its migration policy and to taking the 
necessary measures to curb illegal migration originating from and/or transiting Moldovan territory. It 
has done so in the context of Moldova’s European aspirations, and, particularly, as part of its 
participation in the European Neighbourhood Policy, and more recently the Eastern Partnership, 
Moldova’s commitments were, hence, set out in the ENP EU – Moldova Action Plan, under the 
Mobility Partnership between the EU and Moldova, as well as in the EU-Moldova Action Plan on 
Visa Liberalization.  
This paper will first seek to explain the EU’s modes of external governance in Justice and Home 
Affairs (JHA) in its Eastern neighbourhood. More specifically, it will look at attempts to curb illegal 
migration, with special attention to Moldova, based on the theoretical framework of the external 
governance concept. It will, then, assess Moldova’s efforts to successfully implement EU 
recommendations in the fight against illegal migration, against two criteria measuring the 
effectiveness of EU rule transfer: EU bargaining power and domestic factors in the third country.  
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Introduction  
The emergence of an external dimension of Justice and Home Affairs has been seen in the academic 
literature as a result of the change in the security situation in Europe at the end of the 1990s. The 
gradual expansion of the European project eastwards and southwards, bringing the European Union 
closer to poorer and less democratic regions, saw military threats replaced by “soft security threats”, 
including illegal migration. Therefore, Justice and Home Affairs are set to become a key priority for 
the EU’s external relations. The most important step, in this regard, was made by the Amsterdam 
Treaty (1997), transferring border control, visa, migration and asylum up to the Community level. 
This, then, continued with official acknowledgment of the need to integrate JHA matters with other 
EU policies, including external relations, at the Tampere European Council (1999). From this point on 
the external dimension of JHA matters continued to develop at three levels: sectoral, integrated in 
various policy fields, namely development, trade, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
neighbourhood policy; horizontal, being integrated in EU relations with neighbouring and third 
countries; and vertical, i.e. the progressive transformation of decision-making over JHA matters 
(Trauner et al., 2012; Wolf & Mounier, 2012). The need for a “coherent” EU approach in fighting 
illegal migration was stressed in the 2005 Hague and 2010 Stockholm Programmes. These demanded 
strengthened cooperation with countries of origin and transit on asylum and migration matters. This 
included migration flow management, integration of migrants, joint border management, enhanced 
security in Europe, in response to the new challenge –EU expansion south – eastward (Ramzes et al., 
2011).Moreover, in the follow-up JHA Strategy, the development of the freedom, security and justice 
area is seen as “successful, if it is underpinned by a partnership with third countries on these 
issues”(Brussels European Council, 2005; Commission of European Communities [EC], 2005).The 
Commission conceives the external dimension as a “projection of the internal Area of Justice and 
Home Affairs, since it’s linked to the ultimate goal of the EU’s internal security” (Ramzes et al., 2011, 
p.284). The link between internal security and external relations has been strengthened even more 
through the Lisbon Treaty that, by abolishing the EU’s “pillar structure”, merged “visas, asylum, 
immigration, and other policies related to the free movement of persons” and “police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters”. More specifically, these were merged under Title V TFEU, “Area of 
freedom, security and justice”, falling under a similar decision-making procedure that gives more 
decision-making powers to the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice (ibidem, p. 
296). Similarly, the European Security Strategy highlights that building up security and stability in the 
EU neighborhood is a strategic objective (Brussels European Council, 2003).  
The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) Action Plans, signed with the EU southern and eastern 
neighbors, was seen as the most coherent cooperation setting. It was in this context that other political 
and economic reforms were promoted including the EU JHA norms and enhanced cooperation with 
third countries on the rule of law, migration and asylum matters (Trauner et al., 2012).The 
development of the European Neighborhood Policy is path-dependent, being built on the model of 
Eastern enlargement. However it lacks the most important EU foreign policy tool deployed during the 
last round of enlargement of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries – namely, political 
conditionality, i.e. the promise of EU membership (Lavenex, 2008). The ENP follows the same 
institutional setting and monitoring scheme previously applied to CEE countries. However, it does not 
treat participating countries equally to candidate countries or potential candidate countries, part of the 
Western Balkans’ Association and Stabilization Process (Sasse, 2008). Therefore, the ENP is a new 
form of promoting internal EU governance outside EU borders, without the pledge of future EU 
membership. The purpose of this study is to illustrate the EU’s external governance of the aquis 
communautaire in Justice and Home Affairs, and, more specifically irregular migration. I will focus 
on explaining how the EU deploys its conditionality without the promise of membership in such a 
sensitive policy area. Further, I will assess the effectiveness of the EU’s external governance of 
irregular migration issues in Moldova, based on two factors, derived from the external governance 
theory, namely EU bargaining power and domestic factors.  
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In the sections that follow I will examine external governance theory, by pointing out different 
modes of external governance. These will help build up the analytical framework of the paper. 
Then, I will spell out the mode of EU external governance of irregular migration rules and 
standards as applied in Moldova. I will finally assess the effectiveness of this mode of external 
governance for Moldova.  
External Governance Theory 
Derived from foreign policy and European integration theories, the external governance approach has 
lately sparked researchers’ interest. It marks, after all, the success of transferring EU norms to CEE 
countries, joining the EU in 2004 and 2007, by employing one of its most efficient foreign policy tools 
– governance by conditionality (Lavenex, 2004; Lavenex, 2008). Back then, EU rules and policies 
were exported beyond its borders in exchange for a credible offer of future EU membership. In the 
context, however, of Union’s “enlargement fatigue”, scholars’ attention has moved to the EU’s current 
usage of external governance in its relations with third countries, without offering the prospect of 
membership. Moreover, they focused their attention on the effect of EU rules on third countries where 
there is no hope of membership (ibidem). Thus, the EU’s external governance can be defined as a 
foreign policy tool alternative to more traditional approaches. It consists in the transfer, by the EU, of 
its internal democratic norms, rules and policies, i.e. the acquis communautaire, in its vicinity as a 
form of integration alternative to enlargement (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009). Subsequently, the 
external governance of the JHA, the term used in this paper, can be defined as the gradual transfer of 
EU rules and norms in the JHA policy area in order to achieve the objectives of the Justice, Freedom 
and Security Policy. The employment of this innovative approach is intended to shape in the 
neighbourhood a polity that would become more similar to the EU polity, thus, aiming to ensure  
security and stability at the EU borders. However, compared to foreign policy theories, which focus on 
the analysis of the unitary states’ behaviour, the external governance theory builds on the procedural 
and institutional impact of the EU beyond its borders (ibidem). 
For the purposes of this paper, it is important to describe the theoretical institutional modes of 
external governance deployed by the EU in relation to third countries, namely: hierarchical and 
network governance. Hierarchical governance embraces a top-down relationship, implying “a form of 
steering based on formal and precise rules [in a specific policy area] that are non-negotiable and 
legally binding upon [subordinated] actors”. This is underpinned by sanctioning mechanisms in cases 
of non-compliance (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009, p.797). The EU refers to the “Community 
method of policy-making”, i.e. the approximation of supranational European laws to those of member 
states. But the candidate or potential candidate countries also pass through prescriptive procedures, 
with monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms (ibidem). Another mode of external governance 
employed by the EU in relation to third countries, usually the ENP countries, where it lacks the 
conditionally, based on the membership incentive, is network governance. Thus, in order to induce 
third countries to comply, a set of lower external incentives is used, and, consequently, the high degree 
of formalization applied to the member or EU candidate states when transferring EU rules is replaced 
with more operational cooperation (Schimmelfenning & Sedeleier, 2004; Youngs, 2009). Network 
governance refers to a horizontal relation  between two partners with equal rights, based on their 
mutual agreement with room left for negotiation-based settlement of debatable points. When applied 
to the EU, this mode of governance is employed in policy sectors, where there is a disparity between 
the interests of member states and those of the countries to which EU norms are transferred. For 
instance, in the case of the ENP countries network governance is deployed through ENP Action Plans, 
the horizontal co-ordination of experts in the ENP sectoral sub-committees, as well as forums, 
exchanges of experience etc. To ensure that EU rule transfer is effective and legitimate, deliberative 
and interactive tools are used, such as social learning, socialization and lesson-drawing (ibidem).To 
reflect on the effectiveness of these modes of external governance, it is important to learn a little more 
about the literature on this subject.  
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Effectiveness of EU’s external governance 
One of the most critical issues argued over by proponents of the external governance approach is the 
determinants impinging upon an effective external governance of EU norms and policies beyond its 
borders. The most successful case, in the eyes of researchers is governance by conditionality, which 
allows the EU to exert its bargaining power over third countries, applied, as explained above, during 
the accession process of CEE countries (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009; Schimmelfennig & 
Sedelmeier, 2004). When applied to ENP countries, external governance of the EU aquisis is 
challenged. There is no consistent incentives structure, still less the bait of membership – -
conditionality as referred to in the academic literature – that would induce these countries to comply 
with EU requirements (Lavenex & Witchman, 2009; Baltag & Romanyshin, 2011). This causes a 
strong asymmetry, where EU interests outweigh those of Eastern and Southern neighbours, notably in 
critical areas for the EU like the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (ibidem). Therefore, the EU’s 
ability to exert rule transfer to third countries is thus constrained by its limited bargaining power. In 
this situation the EU had to devise alternative incentives to induce neighbouring countries to 
implement political and economic reforms. These have included “a stake in the internal market”, the 
possibility of benefitting from visa facilitation for certain categories of persons (EC, 2003). This new 
form of conditionality, called by the researchers “conditionality-lite”, moves forward from the 
traditional conditionality model, based on membership reward, implying the application of the 
principle “sharing everything, but the institutions”(Sasse, 2008, p.301). This type of conditionality has 
been criticized by researchers given the vagueness of its main leverage mechanism. EU incentives 
cause a blurred dividing line between the enlargement model and the ENP model, since commitments 
from the partner countries are higher than rewards from the EU, which might jeopardize EU rule 
transfer (Baltag&Romanyshyn, 2011).  
Youngs distinguishes at least three factors that can determine the mode and effectiveness of 
external EU governance (2009).The first one is EU bargaining power, namely the leverage that the EU 
can employ over third countries, through the size of rewards that it can offer in return for compliance 
with EU rules. Thus, the EU would use a more hierarchical mode of governance in relation to the 
candidate and potential candidate countries. In this respect it can fully exert its conditionality, by 
offering the highest reward –EU membership. There is also, though, a less hierarchical form of 
governance in the case of the ENP countries, where the EU lacks full conditionality. However, the EU 
still attempts to deploy a hierarchical mode of governance in strategic policy areas for the Union, such 
as the fight against irregular migration, for instance, through the signing of readmission agreements. 
But, given the asymmetry of interests in favour of the EU, the EU is obliged to resort to additional 
incentives, such as visa facilitation or liberalization (Lavenex & Witchman, 2009).  
The other variable, which in Youngs’ opinion would influence the mode and effectiveness of the 
way in which the EU exerts its governance, is the domestic politics of third countries, for example, the 
type of political regime. More specifically, whereas weak and less democratic domestic structures 
would allow less room for the exertion of EU influence, more “potent” domestic structures would 
contribute to more effective external governance in the EU (2009). In their turn, Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennning (2009)point to three conditions in which domestic structures impinge upon the 
effectiveness of EU external governance: first, when the EU rules “resonate well with domestic rules, 
traditions, and practices” (p. 804); second, when the third country’s domestic institutions, including 
state and societal institutions, are compatible with the EU member states’ institutions; and third, when 
there are a small number of veto players (i.e. the government or other stakeholders) that oppose EU 
rules, because of the unacceptable costs they might confront as a result of adopting 
them(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004).  
A third determinant of the EU’s external governance is, in Youngs’ opinion, the geo-strategic 
factor. More specifically, the nature of the EU’s geo-strategic interest determines its choice to get  
involved in a third country’s politics, to promote “either status-quo or transformational diplomacy”, 
“short-term stability” or “longer-term political reform”(2009, p. 900). At the same time, one of the 
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EU’s foreign policy objectives in the Eastern neighbourhood is to maintain good relations with another 
important international actor – Russia. This concern makes the EU reluctant to get involved more 
deeply in the neighbourhood (ibidem, Popescu&Wilson, 2009).  
Methodology 
In order to assess the effectiveness of the external governance of EU norms on irregular migration in 
Moldova, I will examine the content of the framework documents which institutionalize EU-
Moldovan relations in general. I will particularly look at those which lay down Moldova’s 
commitments towards the EU with regard to fighting illegal migration originating from or transiting 
Moldovan territory. More specifically, these are: the EU- Moldova Action Plan, the Declaration on a 
Mobility Partnership between the EU and Moldova, as well as the EU-Moldova Action Plan on Visa 
Liberalization.  
It is important to differentiate the purposes and timeframes of the three documents. The EU-
Moldova Action Plan is a broader policy document signed between the EU and Moldova in the 
framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. It sets an agenda of political and economic 
reforms for Moldova to be implemented2005-2008. However, given the slow progress in 
implementation, it was extended to 2009, and remains the basis for the implementation of reforms 
(European Commission European Neighbourhood Policy [EC ENP], 2004). The Declaration on a 
Mobility Partnership between Moldova and the EU is a tool of the EU’s Global Approach to Migration 
(EC, 2007). It is intended to reward countries that effectively combat irregular migration with better 
access to the EU labour market. Moldova, in fact, took a proactive role in signing the Declaration in 
2008. Finally, the Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation (VLAP) is a framework document developed by 
the European Commission for Moldova as part of the visa liberalisation processes initiated by the EU 
in the Eastern Partnership countries. These processes are supposed to grant Eastern neighbours the 
right to visa-free movement within the Schengen area, in return for consistent reforms. The VLAP is, 
as of the beginning of 2011, being implemented.  
I also make use of the discourse analysis of EU and Moldovan officials, as well as of European and 
Moldovan experts and think tanks with regard to Moldova’s progress towards implementing these 
policy documents. This will be based on official and third-party assessment reports, declarations, as 
well as interviews with relevant parties.  .  
The purpose of this research is to look into the effectiveness of EU rule transfer into Moldovan 
policies in terms of the fight against illegal migration. This stands or falls in terms of the effective 
transposition and implementation by Moldova of EU norms and rules. To measure the effectiveness of 
EU rule transfer I make use of two independent variables derived from the above mentioned theories 
of EU’s external governance: EU bargaining power in giving significant rewards to Moldova for its 
efforts; and domestic factors, including the domestic costs for adoption of the EU rules, the capacity of 
the administration, and the existence of veto players that may oppose this process. These variables 
have been chosen, as in Moldova, a country with constant European aspirations, they are deemed 
enough to explain whether the EU’s external governance has or has not been effective. Consequently, 
the dependent variable is Moldova’s commitment to adopting EU rules.  
Therefore, I claim here that the stronger the EU’s bargaining power, i.e. its capacity to offer 
effective rewards for compliance, the greater Moldova’s commitment to incorporating EU norms into 
domestic legislation, and to implementing said laws. The most effective EU reward would be the 
prospect of future membership. I will also consider other significant rewards that the EU is offering to 
Moldova in return for adopting its standards, in terms of the fight against illegal migration.  
The second independent variable I am going to test are Moldovan domestic factors. By “domestic 
factors” I mean: the government’s political will in adopting and implementing laws, given the size of 
domestic costs borne as a result of approximation to the EU; and the capacity of the government to 
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implement EU rules, when their transposition is completed (Lavenex, 2008; Lavenex & Witchman, 
2009). By “capacity” I herein mean the existence of financial or HR resources, institutional inertia and 
policy legacies that might boost or, on the contrary, hinder the appropriate implementation of rules. 
Therefore, I assume that the lower the costs in terms of EU rules, the more successful their 
transposition into Moldovan policies. Moreover, the stronger the capacity of administration, the more 
efficient the implementation of these rules.  
I structure my further assessment as follows: first, I will explain the modes of external governance 
of EU rules and norms in irregular migration matters, as applied in the case of Moldova; second I will 
assess the effectiveness of EU rule transfer, based on the above mentioned criteria: EU bargaining 
power and domestic factors; and finally I will draw my conclusions.  
External governance of EU policy on irregular migration: the case of Moldova 
EU enlargement policy has, at its core, a hierarchical mode of external governance. In contrast the 
ENP, formulated in 2004 to strengthen security in the new EU neighborhood, in the absence of 
accession conditionality, generally features a network mode of governance, based on horizontal 
relations between equal partners. Nevertheless, as the ENP implies the obligation for neighboring 
countries to approximate their legislation to the EU acquis through an agenda of reforms laid down in 
the ENP Action Plans, set out for a defined period of time, as well as a monitoring mechanism 
(Commission’s reporting on the Action Plans’ implementation),  there are also elements of 
hierarchical governance (Lavenex, 2008). On the other hand, the commitments assumed within the 
ENP were negotiated and agreed on with third countries separately. They were not unilaterally 
imposed. Rather they were assessed based on each country’s previous relations with the EU, its needs 
and capacity, as well as common interests and the country’s level of interest in further European 
integration (ibidem).  
Illegal migration was barely mentioned as an issue in the first bilateral document institutionalizing 
EU-Moldova relations – the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement, 1994). Therefore, the EU-Moldova Action Plan (EUMAP), signed in 2005, is the first EU-
Moldova bilateral arrangement which, besides setting an agenda of cooperation in a number of policy 
areas, allotted a consistent number of measures in the fight against irregular migration, under a 
separate section “Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs”(EC ENP, 2004).These included inter alia: 
monitoring of migratory flows from, via and towards the EU countries and exchange of information 
concerning the volume of illegal migration flows; adoption and implementation of a National Action 
Plan on Migration and Asylum Issues; adjusting Moldovan legislation and institutions dealing with 
migration and asylum matters to EU standards; and setting up an efficient border management system 
at the Moldovan borders, and, particularly, at the Transnistrian perimeter, which is not controlled by 
the Moldovan authorities (ibidem). Despite the non-binding nature of the document, the hierarchical 
elements of the EU’s external governance are present through the issuance of regular Commission 
opinions on Moldova’s performance under the EUMAP. They are also present in the content of the 
document, giving more responsibility for the implementation of measures to Moldova rather than to 
the EU (Association for Participatory Democracy [ADEPT] &EXPERT-GRUP, 2008).   
Another framework for bilateral cooperation allowing the EU to exert a hierarchical mode of 
interaction with Moldova was the launch of a visa dialogue. This resulted in the drafting by the 
European Commission and the subsequent unilateral handing over to the Moldovan authorities, 24 
January 2011, of an Action Plan on Visa Liberalization(VLAP) “setting out all the conditions to be 
met by the Republic of Moldova before the establishment of a visa-free travel regime [for the 
Moldovan citizens to enter the Schengen Zone], with a view to the visa dialogue entering a fully 
operational phase as soon as appropriate”(EU – Republic of Moldova Visa Dialogue, 2010). 
Moreover, the provisions set out in the Action Plan for Moldova are more demanding and the 
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decision-making process is more cumbersome, compared to the “roadmaps” employed by the EU, for 
the same purpose, in the Western Balkan countries. I will illustrate this below. 
The use of a readmission clause in both EUMAP and VLAP for Moldova is another hierarchical 
element of the EU’s external governance in the area of JHA .The EUMAP included the obligation to 
negotiate and sign a readmission agreement with the EU and other countries of origin and transit, in 
exchange for visa facilitation. The VLAP states, meanwhile, that any progress towards a visa-free 
regime with the EU is conditional upon the “effective implementation of the readmission agreement” 
(ADEPT; ibidem). 
Considering the sensitiveness of this area generally, the hierarchical elements of the EU mode of 
governance were supplemented by the EU being able to participate in sectoral cooperation 
frameworks, Community programs and agencies: this was a way of ensuring the effectiveness of 
external governance Examples of such cooperation framework between the EU and the Eastern 
Partners, including Moldova, are the regional networks: the Söderköping, Budapest and Prague 
Processes. The Söderköping Process was launched in 2001, to boost cooperation between the countries 
situated along EU borders. It has served, since 2004, the goal of sharing best practices among EU 
member states with Eastern neighbors in adjusting their asylum, migration and border management 
related policies, to international and EU standards (Lavenex & Witchman, 2009). Although initially 
conceived as an informal partner-led network, the Söderköping Process has been transformed into a 
government-led cooperation platform, and, in 2011, it was integrated into the EU Eastern Partnership 
Panel on Migration and Asylum, aiming at “facilitating the approximation of standards […] in asylum 
and migration issues” to EU policies and practices, with a capacity-building role, which point to some 
hierarchical elements of rule-export (ibidem; Freybourg et al., 2009). Other regional networks in 
which Moldova participates include the Budapest Process, an informal intergovernmental consultative 
platform, aiming at sharing best practices in the field of regular and irregular migration, asylum, 
trafficking in human beings, readmission of persons etc. Moldova is also part of the Prague Process, a 
more recent ministerial level network, for promoting migration partnerships between participating 
countries, called by the European Commission a “key regional framework for the dialogue under the 
Global Approach to Migration and Mobility towards Eastern and South-Eastern neighborhood of the 
EU”(ICMPD, n.d.a; ICMPD, n.d.b). Having a wider geographic scope, these networks’ primary 
objective is the prevention of irregular migration.  
The EU’s network mode of external governance in migration and asylum is also projected through 
EU-funded operational programmes. Most of these include as objectives combating illegal migration 
and fostering the readmission of illegal migrants, e.g. the AENEAS Program and its successor the 
Migration and Asylum Thematic Program (Freybourg, 2012; EUROPAID, n.d). Although these 
project-based networks imply the participation of non-state actors, i.e. NGOs and international 
organizations, their main goal is to foster the transfer of international and European standards in 
migration and asylum matters, thus implying elements of hierarchical governance (Lavenex & 
Witchman, 2009). But this top-down governance has been more obvious in the case of Moldova 
through EU-led border control operations, such as the EU border control mission at the Ukrainian-
Moldovan border (EUBAM). This mission was set up in 2005 and it has been extended three times 
already (in 2005, 2009, and 2011), with the current mandate till 2015 (EUBAM, n.d.). Through 
EUBAM, experts from EU agencies like EUROPOL, FRONTEX etc., as well as 17 EU Members 
States are assisting Moldova and Ukraine in these countries’ border management practices, including 
the fight against illegal border crossings. This brings Moldovan standards closer to EU standards, and 
gives a free hand in monitoring the flow of goods and persons at the Moldovan-Ukrainian border, 
including the Transnistrian sector, which is outside Moldovan control (EUBAM, 2011). Besides its 
involvement in the EUBAM works, the socialization of the EU Border Agency, FRONTEX with the 
Moldovan custom authorities, was intensified through a working arrangement with the agency.  
However, there are instances where Moldova influenced EU rule and standard transfer in the JHA 
area, in general, and irregular migration, in particular. There was, for example, the Mobility 
The EU’s external governance of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA): have Moldova’s policy efforts to curb illegal migration been successful? 
MPC AS No.2013/04 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 7 
Partnership, a non-binding tool developed as part of the EU’s Global Approach to Migration. This was 
supposed to provide better opportunities to legally move and work in in the EU for the citizens of 
those third countries, that “commit themselves to actively cooperate with the EU in management of 
migration flows”, including curbing “illegal migration” (EC, 2007). The Moldovan authorities were 
pro-active in lobbying for the signing, of a Declaration on a Mobility Partnership with the EU, 21 May 
2008, as well as in developing the content of a “mobility package”, by proposing several ‘non-papers’, 
containing project initiatives under the three main components of the partnership: promoting legal 
mobility and integration of Moldovan migrants in the EU; efficient border management and policies to 
combat illegal migration and human trafficking; and  enhancing the positive impact of migration on 
development (Joint Declaration, 2008; Sagrera, 2011b; personal communication with a Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and European Integration [MFAIE] official, November, 2012).  
Thus, in order to export its rules in the fight against irregular migration, the EU attempts to use 
hierarchical instruments of governance, given the impact that these matters may have on internal EU 
security, through the ENP Action Plans, Visa Liberalization Action Plans, or the readmission 
agreements signed with the neighboring countries. However, due to the non-binding nature of the ENP 
Action Plans, and the lack of strong incentives to boost third countries’ compliance (i.e. the prospect 
of EU membership), the EU also has to resort to a network mode of external governance: socialization 
in the framework of cooperation processes aiming at exchanging good practices, capacity-building, 
and non-binding cooperation arrangements. In order to assess this type of external governance, the 
following section will look into how well the Government of Moldova complies with EU 
recommendations to fight illegal migration set forth in the above-mentioned framework documents: 
the EU-Moldova AP, the Visa Liberalization Action Plan and the Joint Declaration on a Mobility 
Partnership (the last mainly contributing to the achievement of the objectives laid down in the first two 
documents). Here I take into consideration two factors: the EU’s bargaining power in relation to 
Moldova and domestic factors.  
Moldova’s adoption and implementation of EU rules to curb illegal migration 
Impact of EU’s bargaining power on Moldova’s compliance 
Under the ENP EU-Moldova Action Plan (EUMAP), Moldovan migration policy developed. Thus, 
since 2006, Moldovan migration policy has aimed at complying with EU standards and policies, 
strengthening state institutions dealing with migration policy and fighting illegal migration, including 
illegal transit migration (Moșneaga, 2011). This process kicked off with the setting up, in August 
2006, under the leadership of the Moldovan Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, of a 
Governmental commission for the coordination of migration-related activities. There have been 
inconsistencies detected during EUMAP implementation. However, it is important to focus on 
achievements in the fight against irregular migration, pointed to in the European Commission and 
think tanks’ reports. A significant success was the EU Mission at the Moldovan-Ukrainian Border 
(EUBAM), established in 2005 and extended until 2015: the main goal of which was to modernize 
border management, including illegal crossings through the promotion of the Integrated Border 
Management Strategy. EUBAM’s efficiency in reducing smuggling and illegal migration at the 
border, including the Transnistrian segment, was acknowledged by both researchers and the European 
Commission (ADEPT & EXPERT-GRUP, 2008; EC, 2009; Gotișan, 2012). According to a Foreign 
Policy Association report, the illegal migration flows taking place across the Moldovan-Ukrainian 
border constantly decreased from 2007 to 2011, resulting in a number of illegal migration cases 
detected at the EU (Romania)-Moldova border that constitute about 1% of the total number of cases of 
illegal migration at EU external borders (Gotișan, 2012). Furthermore, Moldova adjusted its 
legislation in conformity with EU and international standards and ratified or, progressed in 
implementing several international and European instruments, such as the European Convention on 
the Legal Status of Migrant Workers, the UN Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of 
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Refugees, the UN Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons etc. (EC, 2012a). An institutional 
reform was carried out to streamline migration management and to strengthen the role of the Bureau 
on Migration and Asylum under the Ministry of Internal Affairs in monitoring migration flows (i.e. 
through an integrated automated migration and asylum system) and to solve statelessness/asylum 
cases. But the EU’s external governance of JHA reforms in Moldova began to be considered a success 
with the entrance into force, in 2008, of the Readmission Agreement with the EU, for the return of 
illegal migrants and of the relevant protocols on its implementation signed with 11 EU members 
states; as well as of the readmission agreements signed with other countries of origin and transit for 
illegal migrants from the Commonwealth of Independent States and Central Asia (ibidem; Sagrera, 
2011a). Likewise, under the EUMAP a Common Visa Application Center was launched, in 2007, by 
the EU as a pilot initiative, to issue visas for the Moldovan citizens to enter, what is now, the 15 
Schengen Agreement member states without a consular representation in Moldova (Litra, 2010; 
Sagrera, 2011a). As stipulated in EUMAP, there is a “reward” for the efficient implementation of 
reforms and for assuming the responsibility to take back illegal migrants coming from/transiting its 
territory. Moldova was to be rewarded through EU openness towards visa facilitation for Moldovan 
citizens (EC ENP, 2004).Consequently, the EU’s reward for Moldova was the simplification of visa 
procedures for 15 categories of Moldovan professionals and people, and the reduction, or elimination 
of visa costs from 60 to 35 EUR, under the Visa Facilitation Agreement signed with Moldova in 2007 
(Agreement, 2007). Despite the prerequisites created for the facilitation of Schengen visas issuance for 
some categories of persons, the rest of Moldovan citizens continued to suffer cumbersome procedures 
in order to obtain a visa: this situation is the result of disparities in the Schengen states’ visa policies 
towards the Eastern European countries (Boratyński et al., 2006). Moreover, European countries 
remain among the most restrictive countries with regard to visa issuance (Henley & Partners, 2010; 
Henley & Partners, 2012).  
Moldovan think tanks admitted that, until the end of the first deadline set for EUMAP 
implementation, i.e. 2008, the Government had put in place the necessary institutions and had adopted 
good laws that comply with EU and international standards. However, they also noted, as they saw it, 
the poor implementation by the Government of the adopted laws (ADEPT&EXPERT-GRUP, 2008). 
One of the causes of the Government’s low performance is the low level of EU incentives, including 
the lack of the promise of membership for Moldova, under the agreed terms of the ENP EUMAP. 
Thus, according to the think tanks’ monitoring report, the Moldovan authorities only signed the 
EUMAP with reticence, due to the fact that it put Moldova “in the same basket” as countries without a 
European vocation (ibidem). The shortcomings, especially in implementing the human rights and 
judiciary reforms that resulted in an extension of the term for the Action Plan to 2009 and up until 
now, could be partially attributed to the same causes.  
Cooperation between Moldova and the EU in JHA has intensified under the EU-Moldova Mobility 
Partnership (MP), the innovative and non-legally binding tool of the EU’s Global Approach to 
Migration. The projects proposed under the Mobility Partnerships, piloted with Moldova and Cape 
Verde, in June 2008, were intended to: encourage legal migration; curb illegal migration; and 
strengthen the links between migration and development, based on the interests of both third countries 
and EU Member States, which enter into the partnership on a voluntary basis (EC, 2007). The 
Mobility Partnership between the EU and Moldova involves 15 EU Member States and includes 85 
project initiatives, some of which are still being implemented (personal communication with a MFAEI 
official, November, 2012). 
Moldova’s selection for the MP was a reward for its progress over JHA reforms, and particularly 
the fight against irregular migration: the entry into force of the Readmission and Facilitation 
Agreements with the EU, in 2008. Moldova’s eagerness to participate in a Mobility Partnership with 
the EU was a result of its hope that this form of cooperation could bring it closer to the EU and to 
future visa liberalization with the EU countries (Sagrera, 2011b). This explains the pro-activeness of 
the Moldovan authorities in negotiating the “mobility package”, by proposing several ‘non-papers’. 
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However, while the second ‘non-paper’ contained proposals on labour migration schemes with EU 
countries, the third focused on policies aiming at the return and reintegration of Moldovan migrants 
into the local labour market (ibidem, personal communication with a MFAEI official, March 2011). 
This attitude can be explained by Moldova‘s concern that it would lose even more workers, since 
approximately one quarter of its workforce was abroad, one third of which (28,8 %) was working in 
the EU countries (IOM, 2008; National Bureau of Statistics, 2008).It is also, though,  a question of the 
reticence of the EU Member States participating in the MP to offer labour migration schemes (Sagrera, 
2011b)). Thus, the scheme was initially conceived as a tool to promote circular migration with third 
countries in return for their commitment “to cooperate with the EU in management of migration 
flows”, including the curbing of “illegal migration”. However, as it happens, circular migration 
proposals came only from Portugal, Bulgaria, Luxemburg and Italy (ibidem). Consequently, most of 
the initiatives included in the EU-Moldova MP focused on promoting reforms to: ensure efficient 
border management; the fight against illegal migration and trafficking in human beings; increased 
awareness about legal migration opportunities; the return and reintegration of Moldovan migrants; and 
the promotion of the positive consequences of migration on development through activities targeting 
the Moldovan Diaspora and the encouragement of investments in migrant remittances (Joint 
Declaration, 2008). Despite the low EU incentive, i.e. the inequitable nature of the tool, the EU-MD 
MP is being considered a real success, having as one of its most important outcomes the development 
of a unique and more comprehensive Extended Migration Profile of the Republic Moldova. This is an 
extended analytic assessment tool gathering data from various national and international resources 
relating to Moldovan migration trends, diaspora, remittances and the like, in order to support coherent 
migration and development policies (personal communication with a MFAEI official, November, 
2012; EC, 2012b). 
Meanwhile, restrictive EU visa policies towards Moldova emerged as a result of the latest rounds of 
enlargements to CEE Countries, though slightly loosened up under the visa facilitation agreement with 
the EU. This made the liberalization of visas for entry into the Schengen countries one of Moldova’s 
main foreign policy goals (Ghinea&Chirilă, 2010; Litra, 2010). Thus, the EU incentive –freedom of 
movement within the Schengen area, without a visa for maximum three months in a six-month period 
(European Parliament&Council, 2009) –would seem a stronger EU incentive for Moldova, compared to 
the previous ones for the implementation of democratic reforms, including JHA reforms.  
It is in this context that a visa dialogue was officially started by the EU with Moldova, in March 
2010, and a Visa Liberalization Action Plan (VLAP) was offered to Moldova in January 2011. 
However, the Moldovan visa liberalization process turned out to be more cumbersome than that 
carried out in the Western Balkans (Litra, 2011). This was mainly due to the rise in asylum pressures 
at EU borders despite visa liberalization for the Western Balkan countries in force (except for 
Kosovo), beginning 2010-2011, which fanned EU criticism and precaution vis-à-vis the future visa 
liberalization processes (Knaus & Stiglmayer, 2011). The Action Plan for Moldova sets out the same 
benchmarks established for the Western Balkan countries, covering four areas of reforms in which 
Moldova should excel: document security, illegal migration, public order and security, and external 
relations and fundamental rights. However, it is actually more demanding compared with the 
“roadmaps” designed for the Western Balkans. This is due to the division of the Action Plan, unlike 
the “roadmaps”, into two stages: one referring to the adoption of legislation, and the second to the 
actual implementation of legislation, which makes it a more difficult and lengthy process; as well as to 
the increased decision-making power of the European Parliament over visa policies as a result of the 
latest EU Treaty reform (ibidem). Moreover, the finality of the Action Plan is uncertain, as the 
document stipulates that progress towards a visa-free regime is contingent upon “the effective 
implementation of the readmission agreement” (Sagrera, 2011a). It is noteworthy to mention that 
during the first phase of VLAP implementation, the Visa Facilitation Agreement with the EU was 
amended, inter alia: to expand the categories of citizens that are exempted from a visa fee; to simplify 
the visa procedures for multiple-entry visas; and to extend the validity of the latter for up to five years. 
(Government of Republic of Moldova, 2012). 
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However, contrary to the EU’s expectations, significant progress was achieved in the adoption of 
reforms during the first stage of the VLAP process. This resulted, in November 2012, in a green light 
to Moldova to implement the benchmarks set under the second phase of the VLAP, which was to be 
even more challenging (EC, 2012d). Thus, to address “irregular migration”, National Strategy (2011-
2020) and Action Plan (2011-2015) were adopted in the field of migration and asylum, focusing 
especially on monitoring and the prevention of illegal migration flows (EC, 2012b; EC, 
2012c).Likewise, the Laws on Foreigners and Integration of Foreigners, establishing conditions for 
granting residence rights and integrating foreigners, were adopted. The procedures for visa, residence 
and work permit application were simplified and accelerated through the setting-up of “a one-stop 
shop” within the Bureau for Migration and Asylum. With support from EUBAM, the Strategy and 
Action Plan (2011-2013) for efficient border management is implemented. Furthermore, the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs is undergoing consistent institutional reform, by incorporating Border Police, as an 
autonomous body in charge of the fight against cross-border crime and illegal migration. It is also 
important to mention the amendments made to the Moldovan Contravention Code sanctioning the 
“irregular stay” of persons, as well as the illegal transportation of foreigners in the country. It charges, 
too, the Border Police with the examination of offences related to the illegal crossing of the state 
borders (ibidem; Litra, 2011). 
In order to understand the importance of the visa liberalization talks for the Moldovan authorities, it 
should be noted that they are taking place in the broader context of an Association Agreement between 
Moldova and the EU. This is a new framework document intended to strengthen relations with 
Moldova within the Eastern Partnership, which will incorporate the future Visa Liberalization 
Agreement. The Moldovan authorities hope to obtain a membership promise as part of the agreement, 
an incentive for the further implementation of reforms, similar to the Association and Stabilization 
Agreements signed with the Western Balkan countries (Ghinea & Chirilă, 2010). However, this matter 
remains one the most difficult issues in the negotiation process.  
The incentives offered by the EU to Moldova for the implementation of JHA reforms, including the 
sensitive issues related to the fight against irregular migration, are, then, lower than the rewards 
proposed for inducing compliance, or even inefficient, such as: the visa facilitations that, although, 
generally simplify the visa application procedures for certain categories of citizens, are still lengthy 
and do not benefit all Moldovan citizens; and the insignificant circular migration schemes initially 
conceived under the Mobility Partnership with the EU. However, against such a backdrop, and, 
moreover, despite EU hesitation in giving Moldova the prospect of EU membership, Moldova 
performed quite well in the ENP and over the more demanding Visa Liberalization Action Plan. It 
performed particularly well during the last three years, in transposing EU rules, and particularly under 
the first phase of the Visa Liberalization Action Plan. To understand why the Moldovan government 
performed well, without being given the promise of EU membership, it is important to assess the 
second variable: the impact of domestic factors on EU rule transfer in the area of the fight against 
irregular migration in Moldova.  
Impact of domestic factors on Moldova’s compliance 
As explained above, the domestic factors that might impact on the transposition of EU standards into 
national legislation refer, in the context of this paper, to the political will of the government to adopt 
and implement reforms. Here the size of internal costs, i.e. administrative capacity, determined by the 
institutional and policy legacies, the available financial and human resources and the veto players that 
may oppose the process of complying with the EU rules must all be taken into account.  
Although previous governments have declared themselves pro-European, the new government, 
which came to power in 2009, has backed up declarations with a pro-active approach to approximating 
to EU standards. For instance, aware of the fact that roughly one third of its citizens work abroad, the 
government has adopted a “pre-emptive” implementation strategy in promoting a visa liberalization 
process with the EU (Litra, 2010; Ghinea&Chirilă, 2010). This consisted in adopting some of the EU 
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measures even before the signing of the VLAP, following the example of tasks laid down in the 
Western Balkan countries’ “road maps”, something which resulted in visa liberalisation for them 
(ibidem). Moreover, as regards the visa liberalisation talks the governing party is generally supported 
by the other parliamentary political forces, as well as extra-parliamentary political forces. At the same 
time, this is encouraged by the general support of the population towards the country’s European 
aspirations, with a constant level of support of 50% and more, as of 2007, making Moldova the sole 
Eastern Partnership country with such a consistently pro-European stance (IPP, 2007-2012). 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the domestic context in Moldova is generally favourable to an 
approximation to EU demands, including those in the JHA area, and that there are no veto players that 
would oppose the process. Potential visa requirement lifting for Moldovans within the EU is perceived 
as something that would benefit the Moldovan society as a whole.  This is why, the domestic costs for 
EU rule transfer are considered low as they do not have significant influence over Moldova’s 
commitment to adopting EU JHA rules.  
In addition, as of 2011, the European Commission’s assessment of Moldova’s performance under 
the ENP has identified progress in most areas of the ENP Action Plan, including the public 
administration reform, despite some issues over the implementation of adopted reforms (EC, 2012a). 
These results have also meant good progress in the adoption of most JHA related reforms, including 
the fight against irregular migration, which, as seen above, led to visa liberalisation talks with 
Moldova being advanced to their second stage: namely, the implementation of the adopted laws. 
However, despite the overall good results achieved by the Moldovan government, some concerns were 
expressed with regard to implementation. Thus, the European Commission’s assessment report points 
to the need to allocate more financial resources for an appropriate implementation of reforms under 
the second block of reforms referring to “irregular immigration, including readmission”, in general. It 
also noted the need to hire additional human resources for the Bureau of Migration and Asylum to 
carry out the tasks relating to the Strategy on Migration and Asylum, adopted in July 2011 (EC, 
2012b; EC, 2012c). A Moldovan think tank, on the other hand, states that it is premature to talk about 
the success of the institutional reforms carried out to streamline the fight against illegal migration and 
cross-border crime, i.e. the reorganisation of the former Customs Service into the Border Police 
(Gotișan, 2012). According to its accounts, though the institution changed its name, and underwent a 
high degree of socialization with EU agencies – FRONTEX and EUROPOL–its working practices, 
and consequently staff’s capacity, should also be improved and carefully monitored (2012).  
It can be concluded that, despite the absence of a membership offer in EU rhetoric towards 
Moldova, the country has generally made good progress in complying with the EU rules. This is due 
to political will, low domestic costs that come along with the EU requirements over irregular 
migration, and EU support for the improvement of administrative capacity. More specifically, most of 
the JHA legislation recommended by the EU, in particular as regards the fight against irregular 
migration was adopted. This process was boosted by the concrete incentives offered by the EU in 
return for its compliance, notably the promise to include Moldova on the Schengen White List, 
including the third countries that do not need a visa to enter the Schengen space.  This good result was 
also due to the pro-active approach adopted by the current government in relations with the EU, 
nourished by a strong political will to come closer to the EU, and eventually to join the Union.  
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Conclusion 
To conclude, this paper assessed the effectiveness of the EU’s external governance in the fight against 
irregular migration in its neighbourhood, and particularly in the Republic of Moldova.  
The first noteworthy point is that the main framework designed by the EU to fight illegal migration 
from neighbouring countries, including Moldova, is non-binding Action Plans. These, it is hoped, would 
lead to better legislation and institutions for dealing with illegal migration, asylum and border control 
issues, as part of a broader agenda of reforms. Due to the progress achieved in implementing the reforms 
set out in the ENP Action Plan, signed in 2005, Moldova was rewarded with a Mobility Partnership with 
the EU, committing both parties to cooperating on curbing illegal migration, and exploring the positive 
impact of migration on development. In January 2011, Moldova was also offered a Visa Liberalisation 
Action Plan, which would entail lifting the visa requirement for entry into the EU, in exchange for the 
effective implementation of reforms to fight irregular migration and for the readmission of its own 
nationals. To export its rules aiming at fighting irregular migration in the absence of an accession-related 
conditionality, a network type of governance is generally employed by the EU through non-binding 
tools: the ENP Action Plans, Mobility Partnerships, and other non-binding cooperation arrangements. 
However, due to the strategic importance of the irregular migration issues for the EU internal security, 
hierarchical instruments of governance are also attempted.  
Second, there was the expectation that the EU’s external governance would not have been as effective 
as in the case of the EU candidate countries, due to the initially insignificant incentives offered by the 
EU, as well as to the absence of the most significant one – the prospect of EU membership. However, 
Moldova performed unexpectedly well, especially in adopting all EU and international rules and 
standards on preventing and curbing irregular migration. This was due: first, to the strong political will of 
the Moldovan authorities, supported at all levels of society by  consistent European aspirations, which 
created a pro-active attitude on participation in the Mobility Partnership, made them pre-emptively 
implement reforms even prior to a Visa Liberalisation Plan being offered; second, to generally low 
domestic costs borne by Moldova, as a whole, for transposing EU irregular migration rules, for a 
significant EU reward – the lifting of the visa requirement – as promised by the EU. This made Moldova 
one of the frontrunners in the Eastern Partnership, and a laboratory for the launch of such EU pilot 
initiatives, as the Mobility Partnership and the Common Visa Application Centre.  
Finally, though Moldova has successfully completed the first phase of the negotiations towards a 
visa-free regime with the EU, the most challenging part of this process is yet to come, as the second 
stage of the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan requires even more political will and stability in 
implementing adopted laws, in such sensitive areas as fighting corruption and justice and home affairs, 
as well as consistent financial means for the proper implementation of reforms. It would be interesting 
to see how the EU will now employ its bargaining power to boost an efficient implementation of 
reforms in Moldova, including the fight against irregular migration. The negotiations of the EU-
Moldova Association Agreement, which are now in an advanced stage, might offer an appropriate 
opportunity to give Moldova the strongest possible EU incentive to ensure the effectiveness of its 
external governance, i.e. the possibility of becoming an EU member.  
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